


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MARCH, 1969

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In your kindness, please bear with us if we make mistakes in the beginning, *but* please tell us straightway if we make them.

Positively speaking, the greatest help you can give us during this rather difficult time is to renew your subscription without delay. Thank you so much.

Paul Crane, S.J.

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CHRISTIAN ORDER is a monthly magazine devoted to the promulgation of Catholic Social Teaching and incisive comment on current affairs in Church and State; at home and abroad; in the political, social and industrial fields.

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Christian Order

EDITED BY

Paul Crane SJ

VOLUME 10

MARCH 1969

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South African Priests and Celibacy

THE EDITOR

I HAVE spent no time in South Africa unless you can count as time one night spent between planes at Pretoria last summer and two at a conference near Johannesburg in 1962. I have passed through South Africa on my way to Lesotho, which I love, on three occasions. The last was in 1968.

On the way back I was condemned, between planes, to a three-hour wait in Jans Smuts Airport, Johannesburg. I commend the experience to no one. This time it was made the more poignant by the sight of an African servant girl kept standing for an hour on the hard floor of the vast crowded foyer where I sat, whilst her Afrikaner mistress sat talking with her friends. No one so much as noticed the African girl, still less offered her a chair; so far as concerned her mistress and her friends, she might not have been there at all. (I remember, as I write these lines, the bitter little story told by Tom Mboya in his book. It was when he was working as a "boy" in a laboratory in Nairobi. No one else was there. A European woman opened the door and saw him in full view, then looked further around; "Is there anyone here?" she asked.) The African girl stood there unnoticed, unwanted, despised; yet, somehow, with dignity and all the sadness of her people, impassive yet overwhelmingly moving, in her fine brown eyes.

I knew then as I watched her helplessness and with rising anger, that I had been right when I said four years before that I could not live as a priest in South Africa. I would be without the strength to resist the corruption, which enjoined toleration of the evil of *apartheid* then acquiescence in its injustice, would gradually force upon me. The situation would be one in which I would not be able to speak or work or fight beyond a minimal point for those whose dignity went unrecognised because their skins were black. South Africa would be a world in which loyalty to ecclesiastical authority would force me constantly to pull my punches. The only thing permitted me would be a certain alleviation of the African lot. I would be forbidden to fight the evil of injustice itself; to stand up, as I wanted to stand up in Johannesburg airport, and protest against the way in which the dignity of a single African girl was ignored by all.

Church policy in South Africa, so far as I can see, is one of tolerating the evil of *apartheid* in the hope that, eventually, the evil will cure itself. Church policy may well be right; but I am not concerned with that here. What concerns me in this context is, I am afraid, myself; the frustration of a priest wanting to fight all-pervasive injustice to the death and forbidden to do so. It would riddle me through and through. Then, unless I was very strong, corruption would come in this sense that I would seek for distraction instead of praying for courage to carry my cross. I would try to find in natural outlets the solace that can only come to a priest from the grace of God. As these failed to satisfy, I would seek more of them instead of seeking help from God. It is always like this: the duck in the pond after weed goes deeper and deeper into the mire. The attraction of natural outlets is cumulative simply because they are natural. In the end, like as not, I would look for a woman's love to heal the wound in my lonely heart; to compensate for my failure to carry an admittedly heavy cross. All the more so, nowadays, in view of the fact that post-conciliar progressives keep holding out hope of a married clergy.

I am not in the least surprised, therefore, that, in December last year, an influential group of South African clergy, as

well as nuns and laymen, with the apparent backing of Archbishop Hurley, should have called for the abolition of priestly celibacy. If they had fought in the past for the dignity of their African brothers as hard as they are fighting now for permission to marry wives, the question would never have arisen. With respect to the Archbishop of Durban, priests in South Africa may be closed in on themselves not because they are without women, but because the representatives of the institutional Church in that country have shut tight too many doors.

Public Service - Private Liberty

"The Fascist principle is Liberty in private, Obligation in public, life. In his public capacity a man must behave as befits a citizen and a member of the State; his actions must conform to the interests of the State, which protects and governs him and guarantees his personal freedom. In private he may behave as he likes. Provided he does not interfere with the freedom and enjoyment of others, his conduct is a matter between himself and his own conscience.

But there is one condition. The State has no room for the drone and the decadent, who use their leisure to destroy their capacity for public usefulness. In our morality it is necessary to "live like athletes", to fit ourselves for the career of service which is the Fascist ideal of citizenship. To all moral questions the acid test is first social and secondly scientific. If an action does not harm the State, or other citizens of the State, and if it leaves the doer sound in mind and body, it cannot then be morally wrong. This test overrides all considerations of religion, prejudice and inherited doctrines which, at present, obscure the mind of man" (from *The Greater Britain*, by Oswald Mosley, October 1932). Readers will remember Fr. Paul Crane's review *Christian Order*, January 1969) of Mosley's book *My Life*.

Everything in the Church seems to be changing. The Mass has no longer the Latin tongue, we can eat meat on Fridays, go to non-Catholic Churches, and lie in bed on a Sunday morning. With sympathy and understanding Fr. Fenn answers these complaints.

A Changing Church

FRANCIS FENN, S.J.

"I JOINED the Church because I was looking for security. but now everything seems to be changing. Latin was the universal language; it bound all Catholics together. At Mass, I don't know where I am with all the changes. (1) All its dignity seems to have gone. I was told it was wrong to go to non-Catholic churches; now it seems we are allowed to do so (2). I don't have to get up on Sunday mornings any more if I don't want to, and Friday abstinence (which used to mark one out as a Catholic) has disappeared. This laxity encourages one to conform to the permissive society in which Catholics have to live."

Forgive me saying so, but there is a good deal of misunderstanding mixed up with this type of complaint; with which, on the other hand, one cannot help having a good deal of sympathy, especially where older Catholics are concerned. I hope they will talk over their difficulties with their parish clergy, or perhaps send them to be answered by Father Lawson in "Any Questions ?"

But one does not want to give the impression that this is a magazine for ecclesiastical "squares": some younger folk feel there is not enough change in the Church. This in itself might suggest that there is something wrong somewhere (this "too much: too little"); not that there is anything wrong with free discussion in the Church, or even with criticism:

(1) Cf. "Documents of Vatican II", London: Geoffrey Chapman, p. 145, no. 19.

(2) "Ecumenical Directory, Part I", C.T.S. 1/-, no. 59.

provided always that this is not carried on as if we were standing *outside* the Church, whereas in fact we are members of it. And some of the recent discussion, especially, of *Humanae Vitae* does give the impression that some Catholics are talking about the Church as if they were bystanders. This would apply equally, of course, to those who seem to find fault with the recommendations of the Vatican Council.

We are all, I hope, glad to be Catholics, and grateful for it. We have received graces and blessings through the Church. Indeed, where else could we go? "You have the words of eternal life". (3) These words of Peter to Our Lord can be applied to the Church; not, be it noticed, because the Church is a sort of spiritual filling-station to which we go and come away: "we are members of his body" (4). You and I are right inside this Body of Christ, the Church; involved in its life, in its work and in its destiny. And because Christ our Lord is himself involved in the destiny of his Church, we should trust it: trust it today, for it is in the Church of today that we live — not the Church of yesterday or tomorrow.

In this Church, there are many different functions, different gifts; and it would be quite wrong of us, and untrue, if we made artificial divisions in it — to speak, for instance, of "they" (meaning the Pope and bishops and perhaps our priests) as distinct from ourselves. (5) The function of the Pope and bishops is to be our guides and leaders: it is a difficult service they have to carry out, but faith tells us that in our following their guidance and their leadership as best we can offer, we are following Christ in this age of the Church's history. They might not be saying quite the same things fifty years hence, or have said them fifty years ago — but that does not concern you and me, here and now.

I will give an example of what I mean. In 1943 Pope Pius XII in his encyclical on the Church, *Mystici Corporis*, wrote of non-Catholic Christians thus:

"We invite them all to yield their free consent to the inner stirrings of God's grace and strive to extricate

(3) John, 6, 68.

(4) Eph. 5, 30.

(5) Read I Corinthians 12, 12-27.

themselves from a state in which they cannot be secure to their own eternal salvation, for though they may be related to the mystical Body of the Redeemer by some unconscious yearning and desire, yet they are deprived of those many great heavenly gifts and aids which can be enjoyed only in the Catholic Church." (6)

Anyone who has read the Vatican Council's "decree on Ecumenism" (7) (especially sections 3 and 22-23) will notice the change of attitude which has taken place. I make bold to say that Pius XII, if he were alive today, would write very differently: and this is in no way to play down the value of his great encyclical which contributed so much to the development of our understanding of the Church. (And he wrote, not fifty, but only 25 years ago!)

"Does truth change?" I can hear someone asking. "Does the Church accommodate herself to the ideas of those outside?" I will answer in the words of the Vatican Council:

"With the help of the Holy Spirit, it is the task of the entire People of God, especially pastors and theologians, to hear, distinguish and interpret the many voices of our age, and to judge them in the light of the divine Word. In this way, revealed truth can always be more deeply penetrated, better understood, and set forth to greater advantage." (8)

It is not a question, therefore, of the Church accommodating her teaching to the ideas of the world around her, but of "testing the spirits to see if they are of God." (9) It is quite possible that those outside the boundaries of the Catholic Church (and this includes, first of all, our non-Catholic brethren in Christ) may have much to contribute to the Church's understanding of her faith and work in this day and age: an age, as the Council often pointed out, which is one of profound and rapid changes.

This is true even of defined doctrine:

"If the influence of events or of the times has led to deficiencies . . . even in the formulation of doctrine (which must be carefully distinguished from the deposit

(6) C.T.S. edition.

(7) See "Documents", pp. 345 & 363-4.

(8) *ibid.*, p. 246.

(9) I John 4, 1.

of faith itself), these should be appropriately rectified at the proper moment." (10)

Thus a doctrine formulated in an era very different from our own might be re-stated, by Pope or Council, in terms more intelligible to modern man. That the Church and its teaching should be "credible" is of the greatest importance, especially in these days when it is realised that the whole Church has been given the commission to penetrate the world and to take the Good News to it.

Of course there must be theologian's language and that used at lay house-groups for discussion, but the latter must be able to be drawn from the former without too much difficulty. "Is it easy to understand? Can it be grasped by ordinary people? Is it current idiom?", Pope Paul asks, in his first encyclical, of all who want to be apostles.

This encyclical, *Ecclesiam Suam*, addressed to the bishops during the Vatican Council, (11) deals with several of the points I have been trying to make in this article.

"The mystery of the Church is not a truth to be confined to the realms of speculative theology. It must be lived, so that the faithful may have a kind of intuitive experience of it, even before they come to understand it clearly It is through faith that we gain this awareness of the mystery of the Church — mature faith, a faith lived out in our lives. Faith such as this gives us an awareness of the Church, and this is something with which the genuine Christian should be deeply imbued The first benefit which the Church will reap from a deepened self-awareness is a renewed discovery of its vital bond of union with Christ". (12)

In a striking phrase which illustrates the truth that Catholics are "one Body" in Christ, the Pope speaks of our "observing the laws which the Church lays upon itself with the intention of following in Christ's footsteps". Although the Church, relying on the greater maturity of the modern Christian, may make some of her precepts easier to observe, the Christian way of life still "demands a not inconsiderable

(10) "Documents", p. 350; cf. p. 349, note 27.

(11) C.T.S. edition, "The Church in the Modern World". (12) 37, 36, 35.

degree of loyalty, perseverance and self-sacrifice: it will not require less of us modern Christians than in the past; it may very well require more". (13) He does not want us to believe "that perfection consists in rigidly adhering to the methods adopted by the Church in the past and refusing to countenance the practical measures commonly thought to be in accord with the character of our times. (But) obviously there can be no question of reforming the essential nature of the Church or its basic and necessary structure." (14).

Speaking of "dialogue with the world", so that the message of Christ may be accepted by mankind, he remarks that trust is necessary:

"trust not only in the power of one's own words, but also in the good will of both parties to the dialogue. Hence dialogue promotes intimacy and friendship on both sides. It unites them in a mutual adherence to the Good, and thus excludes all self-seeking." (15)

This may be applied to that necessary dialogue within the Church herself, of which the Vatican Council spoke:

"The Church stands forth as a sign of that brotherliness which allows honourable dialogue and invigorates it. Such a mission requires in the first place that we foster within the Church herself mutual esteem, reverence and harmony, through the full recognition of lawful diversity. Thus all those who compose the one People of God, both pastors and the general faithful, can engage in dialogue with ever-abounding fruitfulness. For the bonds which unite the faithful are mightier than anything which divides them." (16)

Of these bonds, so necessary if the Church is to be of service to the world, I hope to speak in another article—and especially of the Holy Eucharist.

(16) "Documents", p. 306.

(13) 51.

(14) 50, 46.

(15) 81.

CURRENT COMMENT

Archbishop Hurley of Durban has spoken recently of the ineffectiveness of Catholic Social Teaching. He attributes this in some part to scholasticism. Father Crane disagrees and explains why in this month's Current Comment. He examines the obstacles to the spread of the Catholic Social Movement, as they existed up to the last war and still continue, though in altered expression.

Catholic Social Teaching in Decline

THE EDITOR

WITH respect to Archbishop Hurley, it would seem something of an exaggeration to describe the Church as having been ineffective in its social doctrine. This he did in an interview with Desmond O'Grady which was published in the *Tablet* on February 15th.

Rise of a Movement

For many years prior to the Second Vatican Council, there existed in Western Europe a flourishing Catholic Social Movement. Out of it came the Christian Trade Unions and great enterprises like the Belgian Boerenbond, which was founded before the turn of the century. The International Labour Office owed much to the influence of Christian Trade Unionism. The whole great impulse towards Christian Democracy was rooted in the social and political teaching of the Church; and the three outstanding Europeans who strove for a United Europe in the wake of the Second World War were Christian Democrats to the core. I refer, of course, to Conrad Adenauer in Germany, Robert Schumann in France and, greatest of all, perhaps, Alcide de Gasperi in Italy whose untimely death robbed Europe of one who might have been the century's greatest statesman.

The Catholic Social Movement was not confined to the mainland of Europe. It touched this offshore island of Britain where the work of the Catholic Social Guild brought a knowledge of the social encyclicals to hundreds of working men and, with that message, reason for courage and hope. These did not find in *Rerum Novarum* and its companion *Quadragesimo Anno* any significant trace of the "academic stuffiness" with which a leader-writer in the same issue of the *Tablet* (15/2/69) so ignorantly endows them. On the contrary, they took the teaching of the encyclicals as a framework within which the foundations of industrial peace could be safely laid. Many amongst them did their utmost to give that teaching practical application in their daily lives. The Irish Republic felt the effect of this activity and bonds were formed between the movements in each country which gave promise of future concerted action on a widening scale. Long before this, the Catholic Social Movement had touched the Americas. In the United States, its most typical manifestation, perhaps, was the wide range of Labour Colleges in the thirties. In Latin America it produced the beginnings of Christian Democracy, which Eduardo Frei, in Chile today, has carried to the stage of a rapidly maturing and effective activity. Meanwhile, Christian Trade Unionism has made an impact in South America and throughout considerable areas of Equatorial Africa.

Not Ineffective

A movement productive of such results can hardly be classed as ineffective, though its leaders in the fifties would be the first to say, like enthusiasts in any other walk of life, that the Catholic Social Movement was not nearly as effective as it might have been. This is not to signify that little was accomplished, only that there was so very much more to be done. "Christianity", said the great Chesterton, "has not failed. It has not been tried". The same might be said of Catholic Social Teaching. It has not been tried to an extent in any way sufficient to suit the idealism of its supporters; but this was not for want of trying on their part. What the Archbishop of Durban describes as its ineffective-

ness has not been due to the inability of Catholic Social Teaching to cope with contemporary problems. It is to be found, rather, in the failure of society as a whole to make sufficient use of it as an aid to their solution.

Society and Catholic Social Teaching

There are a good many reasons for this. Unlike Archbishop Hurley, I would allow no place amongst them for scholasticism as having shaped the Catholic outlook "in such an abstract, fossilised form that it is completely out of touch with reality". This will raise cheers, no doubt, from the advocates of situation ethics, but, as an explanation of the failure of Catholic Social Teaching to penetrate society as it should have done, it seems to me far-fetched and somewhat fanciful. Quite apart from the fact that the Catholic Social Movement grew *pari passu* with the scholastic revival inaugurated by the Pope who gave the world *Rerum Novarum*, to say nothing of his great encyclical on Christian Democracy, there is the experience of so many in the Catholic Social Movement that scholasticism ordered their thinking to the point where social and political ideals were more clearly perceived and thereby made easier of application to contemporary society. No, the fault is not to be laid at the door of scholasticism. It is to be found in a variety of reasons of which the first, undoubtedly, was and is the resistance of (primarily) European society itself to the Catholic Social Ideal. In other words, Catholic Social Teaching failed to penetrate society as it should, not because it was ineffective in itself, but, rather, because society did not want it to be so. I have been writing in the past tense, and deliberately so. The period I have in mind is roughly that which lies between the publication by Pius IX of his Syllabus of Errors and the end of the Second World War. It could be described with accuracy, I suggest, as dominated by what can be called the official nineteenth-century mind, which had no room in its categories for Catholicism and still less for its social teaching. It is in the predominance of this mentality that I find the main obstacle to the spread of the Catholic Social Movement during the period in question. It would

seem sensible to subject this view to brief examination.

Origins of the Nineteenth-Century Mind

The origins of the nineteenth-century official mind are in the French Revolution and the philosophy of atheistic rationalism shared by those who made it. For these, reason was sovereign, in place of God; choice, as the fruit of reason, supreme and, therefore, unfettered, an end in itself to be pursued for its own sake; truth what you made it and, therefore, relative; values, in consequence, shifting and without permanence; progress inevitable because guided by sovereign reason; democracy the highest form of political expression because the fruit of rational choice expressed by a people made sovereign because, in them, reason itself was sovereign, with higher allegiance to none. Liberalism was the creed of those who thus made reason supreme in its goodlessness and, therefore, in their eyes, sovereign.

It was against this creed — rooted in man and divorced from God — that Pius IX so rightly directed his Syllabus of Errors. For there was no room in Liberalism of this sort for revealed religion, which was thought of by the men of the nineteenth century as sabotaging the “purity” of free choice with the insertion of its dogmas into the minds of the young. There was no room in their creed for freedom in the service of truth; no room, therefore, for Catholicism; none for Catholic schools; and none for Catholic principles in industrial and political life. This was the mind of Europe’s official class which came to power in the wake of Napoleon’s armies, who carried the philosophy of the French Revolution on the tips of their bayonets wherever they marched across the face of Europe. Where it was not smashed by Nazism, Fascism or the Communism which it largely spawned, this class remained in power until the end of the Second World War. It was finished temporarily in its aftermath and it is no coincidence that, during this period, Europe’s three great Christian statesmen produced the thrust that brought them to power. Latterly, the nineteenth-century mind has been staging a come-back through a new intellectual and technocratic caste. The aim of those who

compose it is not now a capitalist society dominated by unfettered freedom of choice. It is, rather, the Servile State, which Belloc predicted so accurately as the inevitable outcome of monopoly capitalism.

With Respect to Bishop Butler

In the light of what has been said, it seems to me that Archbishop Hurley has small reason for wondering at what appears to him the ineffectiveness of Catholic Social Teaching, still less for attributing it to scholasticism as a significant cause. The wonder is not that Catholics accomplished so little, but that they accomplished so much in face of the official nineteenth-century mind, with its condemnation of religion as opposed to the sovereignty of reason and, therefore, to democracy and progress, which were thought of as of being achieved only when man was divorced from his roots in God. Under the circumstances, I find it almost incredible that Bishop Butler, in an interview given last year to the *Sunday Times* (6/10/68), should chide the Church for standing apart in the nineteenth century "from progress and from democracy" and then go on to comment, as if in sorrow, that, when the First Vatican Council defined papal infallibility in 1870, it was "as if we were throwing down a gauntlet in the face of modern liberalism and freedom of thought". Of course we were and why not? Given the atheistic origins of nineteenth-century liberalism and the agnosticism that prompted its advocacy of freedom of thought as an end in itself divorced from truth, I cannot see that the Papacy had any alternative except to condemn both these expressions of the nineteenth-century mind. In appearing to query this it seems to me that Bishop Butler, with respect, has got his history wrong. The facts are against his thumbnail interpretation of events.

Decline since Vatican II

What has to be done now is to note and comment on the sad decline of the Catholic Social Movement since the finish of the Second Vatican Council. I wonder if Archbishop Hurley has noticed this. I hardly think so. If he had, he would not have been so quick, perhaps, to tie up the scholastic

mentality with the ineffectiveness of Catholic Social Teaching. The post-conciliar scene has witnessed at one and the same time the jettisoning of scholasticism on a considerable scale and a steady decline in the strength and popularity of Catholic Social Teaching. It could be that the two are connected. If so, we have a trend exactly the opposite of that posited by Archbishop Hurley in his *Tablet* interview. This is interesting to say the least. It is also ironical, for Vatican II was insistent in the way it reminded the layman of his responsibilities as a Christian citizen. It is these that he appears now to be neglecting.

Emphasis on Good Works

Or, let us say that he is emphasising one side of them only. Concentration nowadays is on the corporal works of mercy. The young men and women who would have been studying Catholic Social Teaching ten years ago are now more inclined to collect for Oxfam or go walking for Shelter. They are as generous as those of a decade ago. Where they differ is in their manner of expressing their generosity. They are all for doing something "practical"; which would appear to imply that they are content with the structure of contemporary society or else see themselves as unable to affect it in significant fashion. In either case, they appear content to confine their role to that of involving themselves in the troubles of society's outcasts. This is something the Church has always done and will continue to do until the end of time. It is good to see it taken up so enthusiastically today by so many young Catholics; but it is a little naive of them to think that, in acting as they do, they are accomplishing something new and are, somehow or other, more "with it" than their ancestors. I don't see, really, that there is all that difference between Aloysius Gonzaga nursing the plague stricken in the hospitals of Rome and young people of today taking handicapped children for an outing or visiting old folk in their homes.

Empty Minds

What is not so good is the reflection that, in a good many cases, the practice of good works may be no more than a

substitute for the kind of hard thinking that Catholics must learn to engage in if they are to rebuild a Social Movement that will have an impact on contemporary society. It is this that too many young Catholics will not engage in today. This absence of principled thinking is seen at its worst amongst those of their number who protest and play at revolution in the universities. What irritates me most about them is not their dress, which I find quite dreadful, but the appalling emptiness of their minds. As an example, one might take an article written for the *Catholic Herald* (14/2/69) by M. D. Jempson, an undergraduate of Sussex University. The ignorance and lack of logic displayed throughout are awful. Yet, it is in the name of this kind of empty-headed credo that so many young Catholics today revolt and protest.

False Prophets

They have been encouraged in this, I am sure, by post-conciliar talk, at popular level, of "commitment" and "involvement"; meaning by these nothing positive, but a passive surrender of the individual to his environment; the necessary prelude in the minds of some popular (because "pop") theologians to the reception of new life through immersion in the mass. According to these prophets, the Christian's present duty is to lose himself not in Christ, but in the crowd. Commitment, in this sense, is all; ordered thinking irrelevant. What matters is not principle, but the way a man reacts to his environment. Scholasticism is out, situation ethics in. The result is mental anarchy in the minds of many of the Catholic young. We should not be surprised that moral and social anarchy necessarily follow suit.

The decline of the Catholic Social Movement in the sixties is found mainly in these facts. It will rise again only when minds are once more open to influence by the hard logic of Christian principle. We may have to wait for that day, but we must work for it.

A Changing Church in a Changing World

II. More and More Catholic

JOHN MURRAY, S.J.

THE Church of Christ has always been the *Catholic* Church, with its universal or *Catholic* appeal; to the men and women of all times and places. That appeal transcends all the distinctions of our human experience. It embraces all humanity, black, brown and white, for all human beings are God's children and own brethren to Jesus Christ. Here we touch the most fundamental ground for the unity of our human family. This is ultimately why "no man is an island", why no man can contract out of our common human experience and dignity.

The Church was *Catholic* at Pentecost, the day of its first foundation, though its actual membership was then a mere handful. Its Founder was sending it forth to *teach all nations*. Its most eloquent apostle would soon be insisting that it spanned the differences between Jew and Gentile, between free men and slave, between lettered and simple folk. Its appeal and invitation were already as *Catholic* as the Church itself. What must have appeared at Pentecost an arrogant or even silly claim was to become within a few centuries an accepted fact. The Church of Christ penetrated into and permeated the entire society of Europe. It was acknowledged as the Church, the *Catholic* Church, of the then known world.

A New World Picture

The development of recent decades has altered our world picture. Psychologically, the world is now much larger, but at the same time more closely interconnected and interdependent. Distance has been annihilated. A people's security rests today, not merely upon its own efforts but on

its reactions with other peoples, indeed on an effort common to all of them. The League of Nations which might have appeared a luxury in the nineteen twenties and thirties has grown into the necessary United Nations' Organization: and however its achievements may disappoint us, it does correspond with our notion of the *one world*, in which all people are thrown back inevitably upon one another. Europe is no longer what it has been for well nigh three thousand years, the central stage of world history. That stage has now been taken over by the world as a whole. In fact, all history is now world history.

If we study this new world picture, we shall observe that it affects the Church — and this means ourselves — in two ways that might appear contradictory. In the first place, the Church is in fact more Catholic than it ever has been; and yet, the percentage of members of the Church is becoming smaller. Catholics are more widespread, that is *Catholic*, than ever; but proportionately, there are fewer of them in the world. The world's population is increasing most rapidly in those areas which are least Christian. Indeed, it has been calculated that by 2000 A.D. more than half the people of the world will be Asiatic.

More Catholic

Let us reflect upon the first of these assertions, namely that the Church is in effect more *Catholic* today than ever before. This may be amply illustrated by a comparison between the composition of the First and the Second Vatican Councils. The first was attended by about 600 bishops, the great majority of them from Europe. The opening session of the second Council had an audience of well nigh 3,000 and, of these, Europeans were in the minority. There were as many bishops from the two Americas, North and South, as from the whole European Continent. Hundreds came literally from Asia and Africa, all united with their European brethren in the one Catholic faith but with very different backgrounds and problems. The twin marks of *Unity* and *Catholicity* were blended as never before. The same widening character of the twentieth-century Church may be seen in

the local, native hierarchies and clergies of Asia and Africa and in the presence within the college of cardinals of two African members, and of cardinals from Indonesia and Japan, to say nothing of cardinals from the American world. For the Church also, Europe is no longer what it has been for many centuries the one important continent of which all others are little more than accessories and extensions. The Church too has become world-wide.

From many a point of view, this is immensely encouraging. But it brings its particular problems, and these are being understood — and need to be understood — in the Church today. Missionaries have done wonderful work, and heroic work, in Africa and Asia, in converting men and women to Christ and the Church. To confine ourselves to Africa, they converted men, inevitably, to a Christianity which, while it transcended the experience of European Christians, was obviously affected by that experience. The Faith was proclaimed — at the very least sub-consciously — against a background of European thought. It might be said, a little cruelly, that they were turning black pagans into black Europeans, for that was what in one real sense Christians were.

Nor can we ignore the Church's general suspicion of the pagan background from which these new Christians came. The process was seen as a passage from error to truth, from darkness to light. The tendency was to dismiss pagan customs and beliefs as thoroughly bad. A great change is taking place at present that has been given a strong momentum from the Vatican Council. We are learning to see that in that pagan background there are valuable elements, which reflect the aspirations and desires of those peoples towards higher things and that manifest the action among them of the providence and grace of God. Whatever distortion or corruption time may have wrought in them, they have been in their way a primitive schooling, developing a moral sense and an awareness of responsibility and, in short, predisposing men and women for Christian truth. In their more rudimentary manner, they have been and are a *praeparatio evangelica* (a preparation for the Gospel) such

as the Church came to recognise centuries ago in the classical heritage of Greece and Rome,

Demands of the new Churches

This new awareness leads to some very important consequences. With this new-found interest in and esteem for the native background, it follows that the preaching of the Faith must take note of it and express itself in terms of the traditions and thought habits of these different peoples. In the long run, this can be done better by priests from the peoples in question than by European or American missionaries: in the very long run, it will have to be done, almost exclusively, by them. The need for outside missionaries will remain; they must educate and form and encourage the native clergy; but their activity will be rather behind the scenes than in the forefront.

Cardinal Rugambowa made this very clear, in this declaration:

“Here in Africa the great problem that faces us in the pastoral formation of our priests is how to adapt it to the African mentality. It is only by adapting our religious instruction to this mentality that we can hope to make Christianity a way of life that will grow out of a deep inward conviction, instead of being a doctrine imposed on men from outside and only more or less tolerable”. (1).

A similar sentiment was voiced by an African bishop at the Vatican Council, in a conversation with Fr. Kaufmann:

“You see, we are just good enough to help old Europe to clear up its own affairs. We sit here and help with our votes to patch up a situation of the Church which has come about in Europe’s past and to find here and there a way out. But when I began to realize this during the second session, I spent three weeks in prayer and meditation to find out whether I should say ‘Yes’ to a past which is not ours, and out of a feeling of solidarity should deny a desire to do away with what is really

(1) Opening of the Pan-African Catechetical Study Week, at Katigondo, Uganda, August 26th, 1964.

obstructive. . . . But what I expected of the Council was to know what is relative and conditioned by historical circumstances, and what is the kernel, what is the Gospel I have to preach in our continent" (2).

One Glaring Instance

One striking example of Christian differences in Europe that makes little or no sense to Christians in these newer churches is the sixteenth century cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. These churches have not passed through that experience. In their eyes, the religion that claims to teach the revealed truth of God has been proclaiming it in contradictory forms and with discordant voices. The Faith that talks in terms of sympathy and charity has been weakened by controversy and acrimony: and largely because of centuries of division that have scant significance for the non-European Christian. It was a consciousness of this which made the International Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910 a kind of springboard for what is now the Ecumenical Movement. These newer churches in other continents have made Christian churches in older lands more acutely conscious of their divisions and of the scandal of a divided Christianity.

Unity and Catholicity

Unity and *Catholicity* are both essential marks of the Church of Christ, and the Catholic Church has preserved the at times delicate balance between them. There was the unity of Faith, under authority and through common worship which held its members firmly together and toned down the dangers always latent in a Catholicity taken out of its context. Yet, unity was not permitted to stifle Catholicity. No attempt was made to steam-roller all Catholics into one pattern or mould. All the peoples contributed to the common Christian heritage as they were all enriched from it: witness the markedly diverse styles of Christian painting and architecture, to say nothing of the various non-Latin rites that enjoy their treasured place in the Christian inheritance. But this balance calls for careful handling. Were unity over-emphasized to

(2) cf *Hochland*, no. lvii, February, 1965, p. 208.

the detriment of catholicity, the rich diversity that is characteristic of the Church, might be sadly impaired. If unity became too slackened, the whole pattern could be seriously endangered. The newer churches of which we have been speaking will be united with the older churches, and yet will be different. How close the union, how wide the differences; this remains the question. It should be easier for the Catholic Church to maintain this balance, with its stricter insistence on common belief and central authority; but, even here, recent experience has revealed a certain crisis of obedience, and even of faith, within the Catholic Church. And, speaking generally, it may be more difficult to maintain such a balance in Protestant churches.

Dr. E. L. Mascall, the distinguished Anglican theologian, has written wisely on this question. It would be wrong and foolish on our part — such is his opinion — to imagine that the great figures of the Church in Europe — Augustine, Bernard and Aquinas — have nothing of importance to offer to the “future Christianity” of Africa and Asia. On our part, that would be “to wrap in a napkin the talents that God has given and bury them deep in the earth; it would be to keep our riches for our own enjoyment and to refuse, through cowardice if not through selfishness, to share them with those who might make far better use of them than we have made”. On the other hand, he continues, we must expect to discover that much in our European heritage will appear strange and unattractive to our Asian and African fellow Christians, while we may find them expressing themselves in ways that seem unattractive and strange to us. We may even discover that they will produce their own heresies “which will be no less dangerous to the Church and the Gospel than those which European Christianity produced for itself” (3).

The Church in a New Light

The function of the Church is being reconsidered today from a new angle and in a different light. All Christians

(3) *The Secularisation of Christianity*, Darton, Longman & Todd, Libra edit., p. 31.

insist upon the necessity of faith. "Outside the Church there is no salvation"; that is the blunt assertion of the Church's position. Jesus Christ is the one and only Redeemer; men can be saved only through Christ and the Church. These are *Christian realities*, part of the very fabric of Christianity, that simply have to be accepted. In the so-called ages of Faith the distinction was relatively simple. In the language of the Chanson de Roland, "*Chrétiens ont droit, païens ont tort*"; it was as easy as that, the context of white with black. The situations became far more complex in the divided world of Europe after the sixteenth century. How, for instance, were Catholics to regard Protestants who were clearly not members of the historic, apostolic Church which Catholics considered and consider to be the one Church of Christ on earth? Could they be dismissed as merely part of the *massa damnata* of St. Augustine? And what of the multi-religious and a-religious world in which we are now living? And, we do well always to remember, it is a world in which the percentage of Catholics — and of Christians — is in relative decline.

Faced with this problem, theologians have long envisaged another kind of membership of the Church, a *spiritual* and *invisible* association with the historic Church of Christ — in the case of those who have had no effectual contact with Christian teaching. God wants all men to be saved. This is taken as axiomatic, as part of God's beneficent will. God therefore provides grace for all men. Where men correspond with that grace, serving God in the manner they best know how, leading lives of moral responsibility and choosing properly between good and evil, they were considered to be directing their lives towards and fulfilling the Divine Will. This state of mind and soul embraced, implicitly, a *desiderium baptismi*, a desire for sacramental baptism, the necessary means by which the consequences of Redemption are applied to the individual soul. Hence, what we have known as "baptism of desire", though, in the nature of things, that desire cannot be *explicit*, a substitute for the sacramental baptism of which the person in question has no **explicit knowledge**.

The Church as the Sacrament of the World

Theology now tends to consider the Church, in the expression of the Vatican Council, as the *sacramentum mundi*, the sacrament of the world: no longer so obviously as the Ark of salvation, in which all men must be housed, or the barque of Peter in which all mankind should embark: as a beacon light casting its beams over the stormy waters of the world rather than actual ark or bark. The Church is thus the *Sign* of salvation. It is the *Sign* that God has communicated His truth and life to the human family. The Church's actual members — believing, professing members — are those who have fully accepted this communication and have been lifted up to a new association through Christ with God. In them is realized explicitly that grace which God is offering — through Christ and the Church — to mankind. "By their profession of Faith, their worship and life — to quote from Fr. Karl Rahner — the human beings in the Church form as it were the one *expression* in which the hidden grace promised and offered to the whole world emerges from the depths of the human soul into the domain of history and society".

Such theologians will look upon redemption not so much as an *Operation-Escape* from the consequences of original sin and a corrupt nature as the development in mankind of a grace, an appeal which God has given or made to them from the beginning. Grace is operating everywhere and it provides for every man a secret and yet purposeful orientation towards God. Where man corresponds with this grace, he has already implicit within him a *votum Ecclesiae*, a desire for, an association with, a commitment to the Church. He is already, in this sense, a Christian though explicitly he may know nothing of Christianity. His Christianity remains *anonymous*, but it is none the less real. Some theologians have gone so far as to state that actual explicit membership of the Church has now become the *abnormal way* of salvation — so large is the proportion of non-Christians in our world — and that the normal channel is that of *anonymous* Christianity. If, Fr. Rahner argues, the Church was the promise of salvation throughout the Old Testament for those who lived and died

before its foundation, cannot it also be considered as the same salvation, promise and herald for those who, humanly speaking, through the incidences of history and geography, have not or have not yet been drawn into actual contact with it ? The Church was the leaven that once permeated European society. Is it not still *leaven* for the whole world ?

Conclusion

The Vatican Council, in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, reflects this wider and more embracing outlook. It declares that God is not far from men who seek the unknown God in shadows and figures, for He gives to all men life, breath and all things, and the Redeemer wills all men to attain salvation. Further, those who through no fault of their own do not know Christ's gospel and Church and yet, under the influence of grace, seek to do God's will, made known by the dictates of conscience, can reach eternal salvation.

This means, of course, that we have to reconsider the role and function of the Church, insofar as it is and will be a "changing Church in a changed and changing world". This will involve some hard and very balanced thinking.

In this article the housing situation, the Hippies and the loafers, the free enterprise markets, the success and failure of the current five-year plan, and the internal conflicts in Russia are briefly examined by E. L. Way.

Under the Soviet Hammer

E. L. WAY

THE world is never the same after a revolution. The American War of Independence not only abolished hereditary titles and privileges, broadened the franchise so that the whole white male population in most of the states received the suffrage, instituted social and economic reforms with the aim of widening the distribution of property, established the principle of religious equality, but also took the first steps towards the nation assuming "among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God" entitled the American people. Before the last shot was fired it was certain that one day the United States would be a leading world power.

National sovereignty was a cardinal principle of the French Revolution, and it meant the absolute might of the nation, acting through its representatives, to do whatever it sought fit to do. But there was another side. The nation determined that it had the right to make its own constitution or permanent system of political life, and among its first fruits was the Declaration of the Rights of Man. And this declaration was destined to be repeated and renewed up to our own day. It also put an end to legal and social privilege, at least in its grossest forms, all over Europe.

The Russian Revolution is still with us. We live amongst its mighty successes and amid its awful ruins. Amongst its scores of detractors none has had the intellectual calibre nor the powerful eloquence of Burke. Its inhuman despotism has been despised and hated more than any other despotism in history. But it has curtailed the power of property. It

has once and for all questioned the right of a man, or a class of men to own the means of production. For the abuses which arise from this unjust possession it has substituted its own cruel abuses. But it has undeniably raised hopes in the hearts and minds of men that it is possible to order human affairs in a more just fashion than they have been ordered in the past. The effects of the Russian revolution will be judged by mankind long after we are dead, when the dust has settled and the blood congealed.

Housing

Here we merely look very quickly at some aspects of life in the Soviet Union today. Soyuz 5 and Soyuz 4, the two manned Russian spacecraft, were able to link-up in space for the first time in history yet it will be 1980 before the goal of one room per person, plus an extra room for a family is achieved in Moscow. (An American also noted that on April 20, the day before Apollo 8 left on its journey to the moon, he visited the Space Flight centre in Huntsville, Alabama. This establishment was responsible for developing the booster rockets for the Apollo programme. As he was leaving he "saw one of the sights common to much of the South, a ramshackle one-room house, one without water or electricity. The comparison . . . was appalling.") It is not only Cathy who can't come home. Olga is in the same plight. Everywhere in the big cities the conversation of Russians inevitably turns to immediate or future prospects of getting an apartment. The devastation of the war together with the priorities given by the Soviet union to heavy industry and defence have aggravated the needs of the people. In Moscow the shortage is acute. And new buildings can be seen going up almost everywhere. The open fields that once ringed the centre of the city are now covered with 5-, 10-, and 20-story apartment buildings. By the end of this year it is hoped that 120,000 apartments will be built for 400,000 people. Advances in building methods make it possible to put together precast, standardized, reinforced concrete panels in the factories and assembled on site at a low cost. The resulting box-like structures are not

inspiring but Olga, like our own Cathy, wants a private room now, not a 3-bedroomed house 20 years hence. The jerry-building soon shows up: cracks in the ceiling, doors difficult to shut, and peeling walls. But the Russians are not the only culprits. I can see the same cracks in the walls in a £100,000 building not five minutes' walk from where I live. It was 'put up' about three years ago.

But Russian standards are improving. There is to be a greater use of colour and of tile facades. And the Russian rents are a consideration. A worker spends only 3 to 5 per cent of his monthly wage on housing. (The average factory hand earns £12. 14. a week, the engineer, £21. 16.) About 40 per cent of the people live in what can be called "communal" conditions, sharing kitchens and bathrooms. (Some of our own Victorian back-to-backs have one lavatory for 5, 10 or 15 families.) God knows how many Russians still inhabit wooden houses often without amenities. Tales of evercrowding are endless.

"Houses of New Living"

In Moscow two modern 16-story "houses of new living" are being built. The 800 apartments have a communal dining room on each floor which can seat 12 persons at a time. There are ironing and laundry rooms, and on the ground floor a playroom. There are also rooms where labour-saving appliances can be stored, cloakrooms, and a television room on each floor. You can sleep, or sunbathe, or see a film on the roof. The two apartment blocks are linked by a 2-story service building which will contain a swimming pool, restaurants, a beauty salon, a gymnasium and medical facilities. The idea of the designers is that when you feel the need of privacy you can lock your apartment door and have it, but if you want company, or if the wife is tired of chores you can live communally. The planners admit that the "houses of new living" are for professional people; and also that they may not be popular.

Hippies and Loafers

Russia has its hippies. They receive very little publicity,

and they follow a *vozhak*, or leader. Their parents often belong to the upper strata of society, which accounts for the fact that the police do not interfere with them. They were described as follows: "long-haired creatures in multicoloured trousers, incredibly bright jackets and women's coats decked out with flowers, beads, and little bells. Some of them have managed to pull on sacks with a hole for their heads and painted on their backs a huge cactus in a chamber pot. They believe that they can spit on all and everything." From his schooldays, one could only remember one date: 1 September 1967, when he last had his hair cut. "Long hair educates a person", he said. If they had Barbara Wootton and her report, and the government's compliance, they would smoke pot.

The young people are generally bored with politics. They have grown weary of pep talks, communist jargon, ideology, meetings, and tedious group excursions and activities. They are not in rebellion against the system, as our students are in the west, all they want to do is to work and make a good living. Those who are interested in politics, apart from the "activists" and the "careerists", prefer Marcuse to Marx.

They have their idlers. *Pravda* reported an example of "labour discipline". In this tannery work began at 7.45 a.m. and only one person showed up. Out of a shift of 6½ hours time consumed in smoking, a lunch break, aimless wandering about, putting tools in order accounted for 3 hours 15 minutes. In a physiology lab seven out of twenty employees live so far away from the work site that they get their salaries by mail. In other places of work a great deal of time is taken up in telling jokes, doing crosswords, playing dominoes, phoning friends, and shopping.

Free Enterprise

There is a Central Market in Moscow on Tsvetnoi Boulevard which is a paradise for free enterprise. Some farmers fly in to sell their produce and reap their profits. (The flight costs about £32.) Here one can buy anything in the food line if, as in the west, one has the money. The prices are 30, 50 and sometimes even 100 per cent higher than in the

stores run by the state. Hagglng is necessary. You can buy eggs at 10 for 18s. 4d, potatoes at 5½d a lb., a 12 lb. turkey for £10, a lb. of grapes for about 11s. Soviet entrepreneurs, like so many others, are somewhat shy of revealing their profits.

The work on the privately owned plots today supplies the nation with 30 per cent of its total agricultural output, though the plots comprise only 3 per cent of the total farming area. However, there is no more talk of the small co-operative units made up of a few families with a 20-year lease on the land. All trends towards 'private' agriculture have been knocked on the head. Soviet agriculture is the weakest link in the economy.

Current Five-Year Plan

The five-year plan (1966-1970) has recently had some of its failures and its successes stated. Industrial output increased on an average of 9 per cent a year, the national income grew by 7.2 per cent, the annual grain harvest was almost 25 per cent higher than in 1961-1965. (Anyone is free to disbelieve these figures, as long as one is not too selective in suspension of belief.) There is a continuing shortage of consumer goods, a slow growth in labour productivity, and a lag in capital construction. Russians still cannot buy daily necessities such as furniture, woollen knitwear, and shoes. The shortage of shoes will be made up perhaps in one or two years. Funds are, it is said, distributed among too many projects, and many projects begun are not completed. There is also a labour shortage, always a good thing, in the west at any rate for the workers, especially in small average-sized towns. In reply to a frequently voiced western criticism that local enterprises have not sufficient autonomy, and that the economy is sagging under the weight of overcentralized bureaucracy, the reply given is that the local enterprises have fully adequate powers but will not use them. Small and inefficient plants will have to be reduced in number, and the links in the chains of managerial command will also have to be cut out.

Internal Conflicts

There is much speculation as to what is going on in Russia amongst the leaders. The obvious hesitation and bungling

over Czechoslovakia shows that the leadership is not united. Was the action in Czechoslovakia an attempt to consolidate the Eastern bloc so that the Russians can face up to the final and dreaded clash with China? There have been many armed clashes on the long Sino-Chinese border. Pressure of a military nature has been building up there for a long time. On the other hand the Russians may envisage a long-range plan to integrate the communist world into a single political and economic system within, it is claimed, two decades. Along with the integration of industrial production the countries of the bloc would adopt similar fiscal and trade policies. Their separate markets would merge to form one world socialist common market with a uniform price scale based as far as is possible on the costs of production. Currencies in this market would be revalued at more realistic rates with the object of eventual convertibility and finally a common currency. (The readiness to meet the final clash with China would certainly be helped by the development of such a communist world united in a single political and economic system.) One thing is certain, the Russians are paying a heavy political price at the United Nations for their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Their avowal of "peaceful coexistence" was having an increasing appeal in many countries, but not any more.

Some experts think that the conflict in the Soviet Union is between the conservative forces: the agitprop people — specialists in ideology, the apparatchniki — the party bureaucracy, and the Army on the one hand and on the other disunited scattered individuals: Young people and the nation's intelligentsia. The conservative forces are much stronger but they cannot cope with their problems without the intelligentsia. And bad publicity is feared. And they have had plenty of that what with the trials of Sinyavsky, Daniel, Ginzburg, Bukovsky, and Litvinov and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The pressure is on against all those who sign petitions protesting against these events: they are demoted or sacked. Unfortunately there are no liberals at the top.

Since 1962, the Soviet Navy has developed a strategy that can be described as global and oceanic. Its ships are appearing everywhere. What is the significance of this? An informed observer, who writes under the pseudonym of Captain Nemo, answers this vital question in this article. His remarks are extremely shrewd. They deserve the most careful consideration.

New Soviet Navy: What Manner of Beast ?

CAPTAIN NEMO

ON October 28th, 1968 the *Osservatore Romano*, semi-official journal of the Holy See and one of the best dailies in the world, published the following despatch from Paris:

"According to the Paris daily, *Le Monde*, corresponding to steadily increasing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, there is another Soviet naval presence, building up on a corresponding massive scale, off the western coast of Norway. *Reuter* reports that, according to this journal at least fifty Soviet ships are permanently on exercises in the vast stretch of sea between Norway and Iceland. *Le Monde* maintains, further, that Soviet naval craft appear frequently in the central Atlantic and in the vicinity of the Azores and Bermuda where the Soviet navy keeps in being a flotilla of submarines, some of them nuclear propelled and equipped with nuclear projectiles."

Here, There and Everywhere

A fortnight earlier the *Illustrated London News* gave a detailed report, with several highly significant photographs, of the close watch kept by Soviet ships on the recent NATO

exercise, "Silver Tower". The operation was followed, monitored and surveyed by a veritable flotilla of Soviet "spy ships". Russia has about two hundred of these. The pretence that they were deep-sea fishing trawlers was dropped long ago. Some of them, like the *Akademik Kurtchatov* for example, are large units of some ten thousand tons, each equipped with an arsenal of sophisticated electronic devices. A very few, as the *Illustrated* wistfully observes, might be engaged on legitimate research and oceanographic errands, but the majority are up to other business.

It is worth while noting that the Soviet propaganda machine and in particular, the Finnish, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish broadcasts of Moscow Radio denounced exercise "Silver Tower" with violence, stating in its diatribe that "there can be no doubt about the provocative nature of these new NATO manoeuvres an important part of the exercise is concerned with repelling an imaginary attack on Norway. Equally significant is the fact that the programme of the exercise includes a simulated nuclear attack". (1)

The presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean is covered even more extensively by the world Press and other information media. Curiously enough, Soviet information media are in no way secretive about their growing strength in the Mediterranean. They boast about it directly and indirectly. Thus, in a commentary entitled "The Tyranny of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean is Coming to an End", the French and Arabic services of Radio Moscow maintained: "The fact is that the naval imperialist sharks know that the presence of the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean will so paralyse the US Sixth Fleet that it cannot carry out its design against the Arabs". (2)

On another occasion, the same source painted a gloomy picture in connection with the decision of Turkey to subordinate its naval forces to the new NATO naval Command in the Mediterranean, based on Naples: "It is obvious that these naval units will be given the task of combatting national liberation movements in that part of the world and, in

(1) Radio Moscow, 27.9.68 at 16.30, GMT

(2) Radio Moscow, 12.10.68 and 13.10.68,

particular, of bringing pressure to bear on the Arab countries and the Republic of Cyprus. Simultaneously, these measures will serve to support the Israeli extremists in their acts of aggression against the UAR, Syria and Jordan." (3)

A correspondent of *Izvestiya*, in a despatch entitled "Mirage of Rockets", which was sent from Algiers on October 23rd, 1968, derided western reports of a Soviet military build-up in Algeria and said to include a Soviet take-over of the naval base of Mers el-Kebir, proofed against nuclear attack, and the setting up of an Algerian Navy, equipped with missile-carrying fast patrol boats built in the Soviet Union (4). Meanwhile, the UAR was gloating over western discomfiture at the turn events had taken and in which she saw the implication of serious consequences for Israel (5).

Estimate and Image

Jugoslavia was clearly perturbed by these events. Andrew Gabelic writing in *Borba* (Belgrade) last September accused the Soviet Navy of being disturbers of the peace. At the same time, *Tass*, the official Soviet news agency, gave wide publicity to the activities of the Soviet Navy whose ships were showing the flag across the seas, all the way from India to Morocco.

There are two reasons why it was essential to put down, at the outset of this article, the bits and pieces of information listed above. In the first place, they indicate the magnitude of the problem, if not necessarily its nature. Secondly, the message they contain constitutes an introduction indispensable to any analysis of a new weapon of psychological warfare now in the hands of the Soviet Union and capable of operation on a world scale. The frequent appearance of the Soviet Navy in different waters and the contradictions apparent in some of its overt activities make it very important for us to attempt to form a sound estimate of its real strength and purpose. The estimate so formed will not necessarily

(3) Radio Moscow, 21.10.68.

(4) *Izvestiya*, 23.10.68.

(5) *Radio Cairo*, 27.9.68.

coincide with the image which the Soviet Union wishes to present to the western mind through its apparently ubiquitous naval presence; an image of overwhelming and irresistible naval strength, which could lead to Soviet victory in a world-wide Trafalgar without the firing in anger of a single shot.

Impressive Numbers

There need of course be no doubt as to the strength of the Soviet Navy. After that of the United States, the Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. Its submarine fleet alone is made up of four hundred vessels, fifty of which are nuclear powered. Ten of these fifty are of the E2 class, fifteen of the E1, thirteen of the H (ballistic missile) class and twelve of the N (anti-submarine or hunter-killer) class. On the whole, however, Soviet submarines are smaller and weaker than their United States counterparts; the E1, for example, being able to fire their missiles at a distance of one hundred and eighty nautical miles only. The H class (of 3,500 to 4,100 tons only) are equipped with three ballistic-missile tubes with a semi-continental range. A number of the Soviet Union's conventionally-powered submarines could be adapted easily to firing atomic warheads. Amongst these are ten of the J class (each of 1,800-2,500 tons and with four launchers), twenty-five of the G class (each of 2,500 to 2,800 tons), ten of the Z class and 12 of the W class (guided missiles) could be adapted easily to the firing of weapons with atomic warheads.

The backbone of the Soviet submarine fleet, however, still consists of 170 ocean-going submarines of the conventional W class. They are a development of the German U-boat (XXI) and are formidable war machines by any count. Each submarine of this type is equipped with six torpedo launchers in the bow and two astern. Each carries twenty torpedoes. Each has a sea-going range of 13,000 to 16,000 miles, with a speed of 17 knots on the surface and 15 when submerged. The 100 odd Soviet submarines of the F, Z, R and Q classes are smaller and weaker versions of the W.

Surface ships of war are very numerous in the Soviet Navy. There are 20 cruisers and 120 destroyers, about half

of them missile-carrying; 300 escort frigates, which are the equivalent of our own corvettes, 350 minesweepers, 100 missile-carrying patrol boats, 350 MTB's and 200 landing craft. Finally, there are at least two helicopter-support carriers, one of whom, the *Moskva*, hit the world's headlines when she emerged into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. As a matter of fact, she is not a particularly frightening ship, with a tonnage of 20,000, conventional armament and 20 planes on board. She brings back memories of the French carrier, *Jeanne d'Arc*.

Obviously enough, such an array of ships of war, fully manned and prepared for battle, carries weaknesses as well as advantages. Again not all of them are anything like as powerful as they look. The Soviet cruisers, for example, are too large for their assigned task and, at the same time, too lightly armed and armoured. A decade ago Krushchev said they were good enough for showing the flag and carting diplomats around the place, but of little use for anything else. Soviet destroyers of the *Kynda* class are workmanlike ships and some of their fast small boats of various types are equipped with two to four guided missiles. These are lethal weapons, indeed, against an unsuspecting enemy, but their radius is small and they are hardly usable in heavy seas. Most of these Soviet warships are adapted for arctic navigation, and, indeed, Soviet sailors are justly famed for their skill at sailing in and under the ice. In hot climates, however, they are very uncomfortable, all the more so in view of the fact that the Soviet commissariat makes no allowance for a subtropical diet. Naturally enough, a very large proportion of these various warships (both surface craft and submarines) are equipped for mine-laying, a task at which the Russian Navy has always excelled.

To the total of Soviet naval strength given above there should be added the combined strength of the Satellite States of the Warsaw Pact. In all, they consist of eight destroyers, fourteen frigates, twenty-eight submarines and about two hundred auxiliary and small naval craft, some of which are equipped with missiles produced in the Soviet Union. Strategically, tactically and logistically, however, they have

no independent existence. They are completely integrated within the Soviet Navy, which itself has a vast programme of expansion in process at the moment. It includes at least 30 submarines of 5 different types, some of which will be nuclear-powered and armed.

Global and Oceanic

Since 1962, the role of the Soviet Navy has been set in global and oceanic terms. By common assumption, it was its weakness at the time of the Cuba Crisis that forced the Soviet Leadership to back down with considerable loss of face. It would seem that the present great-power phase of the Soviet Navy will remain for some time: its task will be to penetrate the far corners of the oceans of the world: one of its roles undoubtedly will be to fan the flames of world revolution. To assist this global operation, it has at least 200 survey vessels of various kinds, ranging from the *Akadiemik Kurchatov* of 10,000 tons, which is a floating compendium of the most recent electronic devices, to the ocean-going, deep-sea "fishing trawlers" whose job is to chart the seven seas, following western ships, probing western radar screens and frequencies, studying oceanic currents and paying special attention to what is known as the "island strategy". This consists of landing on the strategically situated islands of the world arms and instructors whose job it would be to encourage and subsidise friends, fan local discontents and so on. In this connection it is worth noting that the Soviet Union was the first and, so far, remains the only Power to send an ambassador to the Maldive Islands which became sovereign, at least in theory, some years ago. Again, the seas around Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and so on are visited, frequently and covertly, by a surprisingly large number of Soviet naval craft. It would appear that these can have no other reason for their frequent journeyings except to begin preparations for the establishment in lonely and strategically situated spots of forward bases against a future emergency. It need hardly be said that the Soviet bases in the Antarctic are best seen as vital links in this world-wide chain.

No Leviathan

The picture looks grim and, in some ways, it is. Nevertheless, it is essential to realise that this massive naval force is, indeed, no invincible Leviathan. Paradoxically enough, the principal weakness of the Soviet Navy is to be found in the vast numbers, which appear to constitute its strength, and the theoretically limitless opportunities which are open to it. Let us probe into the meaning of this

To begin with, one has to notice that the Soviet Union itself is a land mass, rather than a land of massive proportions and strength. Like India, it is insufficiently compact and integrated to be considered a nation in the same (primarily constitutional) way that, say, Brazil or the United States can be so considered. In this connection one should notice, too, that the dual system of Government in the Soviet Union (by Party and Government in double-harness, so to say) originated with the schizophrenia that came with the Communist Revolution and has not gone since. What this means is that the Soviet Union is a place where no one can be trusted; even the top controllers have to be controlled. Once you get in Russia a no-autocrat period without a top man to boss the rest, then the top men themselves dare not trust each other. This is the situation at the moment in the Soviet Union. In evidence, one need only cite the gross performance of the Soviet Politbureau during the Czech Crisis; all its members had to take part in negotiations of crucial importance, since none of them could afford to trust the others. Yet, this system of parallel government is essential to the Soviet Union since, without it, there would be no possibility of a coherent administration. The country is simply too vast for overall planning of any kind. Perhaps this, even more than the shortcomings of the planners themselves, doomed millions of human beings to death in the pursuit of a succession of National Plans ordered into operation by a succession of Communist autocrats at the centre and their provincial satraps. The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union is too vast to be managed coherently from the top; the system of parallel government (by Party and State) stops some of the rot, maintains something akin to

bare coherence as the absurdities of its centralised planning are attempted year after year. The whole thing, really, is quite unmanageable.

This quality of unmanageability applies to the Soviet Navy as it now is. It is, in fact, four navies rather than one. The Baltic Navy is divided into two fleets; the Pacific is also subdivided; the Northern Navy is stationed in the Barents Sea and the Black Sea Navy in the sea of that name. The main bases of these different navies are Kronstadt, Liepaya and Riga in the Baltic; Petropavlovsk in the Kamtchatka Peninsular and Vladivostok; Sebastopol and Nikolayev in the Black Sea; Polarnoye, Murmansk and Archangel in the North. The thing to notice is that, from the strategical and operational points of view, these bases might be situated in separate disconnected continents. They are on the Russian land mass and that is all; but what does that mean? The home seas in which these Soviet Navies operate — the Baltic, Okhotsk, Black and Barents seas and Arctic Ocean — might each be considered as a Soviet *mare nostrum*, but each could be closed quite easily by a comparatively weak opponent. In any major conflict each Soviet Navy would have to act independently, as World War II showed very clearly, and each would have to depend on a separate land command. The Soviet Union may well preach and arm for a global strategy, but, within the foreseeable future at least, it will be forced to remain little more than a land-locked power with extravagant ambitions. In illustration of what this means, one need only take a glance at the internal communications of the Soviet Union itself. With the onset of the first frosts, communications by river come to a standstill over two-thirds of the Soviet Union's territory. Railways are slowed down for the same reason and aircraft stay grounded for days — sometimes weeks — at a time. The White Sea Canal, which connects the Baltic with Arctic waters and which was completed in 1933, is navigable by submarines and destroyers only, and that for seven months of the year. The Northern Sea Route, along the northern shores of Siberia, can be taken advantage of by warships for only four summer months a year. Petropavlovsk, on the

Kamtchatka Peninsular, which is the only truly oceanic base possessed by the Soviet Navy, faces the North Pacific. It is ice-bound for three months a year and, even during this time, can be kept open by ice-breakers. Yet, its practical utility is handicapped by its position, for it is hopelessly far away from the main Soviet centres of all kinds and just as hopelessly close to the Alaskan bases of the United States Navy.

It should, of course, be said that the introduction of nuclear-powered and armed oceanic submarines has broken down the limitations placed on the Soviet Navy by the land-mass nature of the Soviet Union. At the same time, one has to realise that the breakdown will probably, in fact, prove very small. It is quite true that vessels of this type could navigate the seven seas indefinitely, being rearmed and restocked on the high seas; but what we have to remember here is that this "lone-wolf" type of naval attitude and strategy is wholly unacceptable to the Soviet Supreme Command on both psychological and ideological grounds. To understand this one has to look at the Russian Navy's revolutionary past.

The Russian Sailor : New Look

Nowadays the Soviet Sailor is aspiring to become in western eyes the equivalent of the Cossack of a century ago. The Soviet Navy has already made an impact on world affairs. Specialists on both sides of the Cold War pay close attention to these developments. The latest edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* devotes substantial space to the Soviet Navy in its introduction to the lists of the navies of the world. Yet, almost nothing is being said about the Soviet Sailor who, after all, is just as much part of the fighting machine, which is his ship of war, as the computers and rockets which he mans. What kind of person is he? From the point of view of public relations, strangely self-effacing. Apart from the turbulent, but transient role of star which he played on the stage of the Civil War fifty years ago, nothing has been known until very recently of Soviet ships or the sailors they carry as crews. Now, however, information is beginning to

accumulate. A composite picture of the Soviet Sailor is beginning to be formed.

He would seem to be much more homogeneous than his army or airforce brother-at-arms. In pictures of Soviet crews, Russian and Ukrainian faces predominate, with a sprinkling of Latvians and Esthonians from what were the Baltic Republics. He is severely disciplined; shore leaves are few and far between and take the usual form of educational and shopping parties escorted through foreign ports under the strict eye of petty officers. Visits of Soviet ships to foreign ports appear to be curtailed or even cancelled frequently and for no obvious reason. Furthermore, the Soviet naval rating, whether he is on board ship or ashore, is submitted to relentless indoctrination courses designed to force him to interpret events he meets in the world according to the orthodox party line. All officers and petty officers, together with a fair proportion of the ratings, are members of the Communist Party. Those who are not are constantly asked to take out a Party Card. It certainly helps the Soviet Sailor along. Despite this, the Soviet Navy stresses its national character and past. There are naval orders and decorations which bear the names of Imperial Russian admirals of the time of the Czars. Naval uniforms, except for the red star on the cap, are indistinguishable from those of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Navy. In the Soviet Union, its victories over Swedes and Turks in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are still celebrated.

At present, there are seven hundred and fifty thousand Soviet sailors, marines, coastguards and naval air personnel. If a composite picture of any one of these were attempted, one would expect to find an ideal member of the Soviet Navy emerging as a dedicated man, pledged to the ideology he serves without wavering, a model of obedience, a sober tourist on land to whom everything he sees would have been explained in advance along party lines; a studious, non-amorous and, above all, silent individual, well taken care of and guarded, even better, by his naval superiors. The thing to remember is that, even if one were to find these qualities in every Soviet Sailor, they would constitute something only

skin deep; a brittle veneer encasing the essentially soft centre of the Soviet Navy in the same way that the external skeleton of so many aquatic monsters holds together what would otherwise be loose flesh. The Soviet Navy, at heart, is afflicted with fear and mutual suspicion. This is its soft centre. The reason is not far to seek.

The Russian Sailor : Revolutionary Past

The Russian sailor, unlike his soldier counterpart, has been in the van of every revolutionary movement (6). This trend did not become less with the advent of the Soviet State. In fact, the outcome of the March and October Revolutions of 1917 was largely determined by the crews of the Baltic Fleet. They mutinied on board their ice-bound battleships and scalded their officers to death in the steam of their ships' engine rooms, whilst the politicians in St. Petersburg enthused over what they called the bloodless downfall of the Romanovs. Later, these same sailors were to provide the first, very dreadful armed executive for Lenin himself. Yet, in 1921, they mutinied against Lenin at Kronstadt, their principal base. It only fell after bitter fighting to crack units of the Red Army under Tukhachevsky, a gifted ex-officer of the Imperial Guards who was himself to be executed by Stalin in the thirties. It took two weeks of merciless siege before Kronstadt fell and Tukhachevsky's men took no prisoners. Later, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party, Lenin was to insist that the harsh treatment meted out to the erstwhile "Pride and Beauty of the Revolution", as the sailors were called by the Soviet Press, was imperative: in his view, their uprising against the newly-hatched Communist State was far more dangerous than all the White uprisings and spells of foreign intervention to which it had been submitted.

(6) In 1948, Major General S. F. Naida of the Soviet Navy published in Moscow a voluminous study entitled *Revolutionary Movements in the Imperial Navy*. It appeared under the auspices of the Historical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Despite this, it was withdrawn from circulation almost as soon as it appeared in print. Its author disappeared. There could be no doubt about his Communist allegiance, but the parallel drawn in the book were considered treasonable. Only a few copies of this work are now obtainable in the West.

What Sort of Men ?

Against this sort of background, it is only natural that the Soviet Navy's political commissars, under changing aliases, should wield far greater power than their opposite numbers in army or air force. Moscow cannot take any chances with its navy. For this reason, the Soviet Naval High Command has always been made subservient to that of the Army. For two short periods only, whilst oceanic doctrine was prevailing in the Kremlin, a separate "Admiralty" existed in Soviet Russia. Now, however, though the same doctrine has been officially adopted once again by the Politbureau, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is only First Deputy to the Minister of Defence who is invariably a Marshal of the Soviet Union. Neither is the quality of the new crop of Soviet Admirals particularly impressive. Given the naval background against which their careers must be set, there is no reason, once you come to think of it, why it should be anything else. One is entitled to wonder under such circumstances just how effective the leadership of the Soviet naval commanders and the response to it of Soviet naval ratings would prove to be in time of war. It may be true to say that, today, the Soviet Union has the ships as well as the money. The real question concerns the quality — the predictability, you might say — of the men. This is in doubt, the weakness of the new Soviet Navy lies there.

What is wrong with the British economy? Is it due to the value of gold, of the franc, of the mark, and of the pound twitching as if they all had the dance of St. Vitus? Is it the fault of the speculators and the bankers? Dr. Jackson gives his answer.

Continuing Crisis

J. M. JACKSON

THE closing months of 1968 were again marked by the familiar signs of economic crisis. Twelve months after devaluation, the pound was still far from healthy, and the balance of payments still far from showing the signs of the surplus needed to enable us to repay the loans incurred during previous crises. The Government maintained that no further economic freeze was on its way, but as soon as its candidate had scraped home in the outstanding by-election the announcement was made of increases in indirect taxation and restrictions on imports. Then came the French monetary crisis which seemed, perhaps strangely to many people, to threaten the pound as well as the franc. Why? What is wrong with the British economy? And why, particularly, should the troubles of the French have repercussions on us?

The International Monetary Crisis

It is clear that all is not well on the international monetary scene. Some time ago there was the crisis over the price of gold, and now at the end of 1968 the crisis brought about by the feared devaluation of the franc and the possible revaluation of the German mark. There is now a fairly general realisation that British economic difficulties lie basically in our failure to export on the scale required to pay for our imports. When this happens, people fear that devaluation may be resorted to in order to boost exports and reduce imports. If, for example, the pound were lowered from its

present value of \$2.40 to \$2.00, an article for which a British producer wanted £100 would come to cost \$200 instead of \$240. Similarly, an article for which an American producer wanted \$240 would rise in price from £100 to £120. As a result, one would expect British exports to America to rise and our imports from America to fall, thus improving the balance of payments. However, the result of devaluation is that the pound is worth less, and people caught holding sterling at the time of devaluation incur a substantial loss.

It is because people holding sterling, or any other currency that is devalued, incur heavy losses that speculation occurs. If devaluation is feared, those who can move out of sterling and into other currencies. Towards the end of 1968, the franc became suspect, and holders of francs rushed to sell them and to buy currencies in which they had greater confidence. In particular, they rushed to buy marks, believing that the mark was about to be re-valued (that is, its value increased in terms of other currencies). France, which until recently had had a favourable trading record had run into balance of payments difficulties following the unrest in the summer and the wage increases that had been conceded at that time. Germany, on the other hand, retained a strong trading position, and therefore the possible upward revaluation of the mark was very real. It was the possibility that the mark would be revalued rather than the troubles of the franc that added to Britain's difficulties. Even if the pound were not devalued in terms of dollars, there was a profit to be made by buying marks before they were increased in value relatively to the dollar. And so there was a familiar run on the pound.

The Case of the Mark

Germany in fact resisted the pressures for revaluation, and France chose to try the path of austerity rather than devaluation. In the short run, it is pleasant enough to see the speculators denied the profits they may have been looking for; though it should be remembered that part of this 'speculation' is a perfectly reasonable attempt by foreign holders of a currency to safeguard themselves against serious

loss.* On the other hand, there is undoubtedly a good case for looking at the present relative values of different currencies and asking two questions. The first is whether there should be some immediate re-adjustment, and secondly whether there should be an end to the present system of fixed exchange rates.

The fact that one or more countries have balance of payments deficits means that some other country or countries must have surpluses. We tend to think that a deficit arises from the mismanagement of an economy, and that a surplus is the result of efficiency and initiative. This may be true, up to a point. But it is not the whole story. In 1925 Britain made a calamitous error in returning to the gold standard at the rate of exchange that had prevailed before the war. Prices in Britain, however, had risen relatively to other countries, and the pound was over-valued. If, at that time, we had returned to the gold standard at some lower parity (making the pound equivalent to \$4.50 instead of \$4.88) Britain's international trading position would have been much better than it was, and much of the misery of the period might have been avoided.

Today it may be fairly argued that the German mark is decidedly under-valued. By keeping the value of the mark in terms of dollars and other currencies unrealistically low, German goods are artificially cheap in terms of these other currencies, and therefore sell very readily. Hence the balance of payments surplus.

Today all the emphasis is on countries eliminating their balance of payments deficits. But it should be an equally serious obligation on surplus countries to bring their international trading accounts into balance. It is obviously difficult for any country to impose wage cuts in order to lower prices and thus increase sales in export markets. Productivity cannot be increased overnight in response to a deficit. The other ways out are devaluation, and deflation — reducing

* It is, in fact, illegal for British subjects to speculate against sterling in the way described. The government should not be complaining about speculators if they are British but prosecuting. If, however, the speculators are foreigners, there is no reason why they should be expected to continue holding our currency, waiting for the Chancellor to knock 10 per cent or so off its value by a stroke of the pen.

incomes, mainly through unemployment, in the hope that purchases of imports will be reduced as well as those of home produced goods. If surplus countries took their share of the responsibility for keeping international equilibrium, it would be far better, for it would not be brought about at the expense of the misery caused by deflation and unemployment.

Germany has accepted some measure of responsibility and imposed a tax on her exports, but a re-valuation of the mark would have been a much more satisfactory measure. It would have removed one of the underlying reasons for the balance of payments surpluses of the country, the undervaluation of its currency. Nor should we suppose that the success of Germany has been entirely due to this undervaluation of the currency combined with a capacity for hard work. Other N.A.T.O. countries, in particular Britain and America have been pouring money into Germany to meet the costs of their troops stationed there. We may think that this is necessary in view of the international situation, and it is certainly done for our own defence. Nevertheless, British troops stationed in Germany rather than kept in reserve at home mean that all the cost of feeding these men, and their expenditures when out of camp is creating a drain on British reserves of foreign exchange (and American too) whilst the Germans reap the benefit. Time and time again they have defaulted on agreements to make purchases to meet the foreign exchange costs. We should be quite brutal about this. Either the Germans should agree to meet the greater part of the cost of maintaining British troops in Germany or we should bring every British soldier back and keep our forces in readiness here.

A Floating Exchange Rate

An alternative to the present system of fixed exchange rates would be to adopt floating exchange rates. At present, a currency is allowed to fluctuate about 1 per cent above or below its official rate. If the official rate for the pound is \$2.40, it is permitted to fluctuate between \$2.38 and \$2.42. Fluctuations of this magnitude are not par-

ticularly helpful. The fall in the pound to \$2.38 will not be enough to have a significant effect on exports, and therefore in a balance of payments crisis the possibility of devaluation to a significantly lower level must arise. The possibility of this small fluctuation, therefore, does nothing to stop speculation.

Suppose that a 10 per cent fluctuation were permitted. The pound could, therefore, vary between \$2.16 and \$2.64. This could be much more useful. A fall could take place in the value of the pound which would be enough to have an influence on exports. Moreover, the benefit in export markets might go beyond the 10 per cent that the pound could fall. There would also be upward pressure on the currencies of surplus countries. Thus if the pound fell 10 per cent in value and the mark rose by say 5 per cent, we would acquire roughly a 15 per cent advantage over German exporters when competing for orders.

(What happens at present is that if the pound falls to \$2.38 because fewer people are asking for sterling at the official rate than are offering to sell it, the British authorities have to step in and buy in order to maintain the rate at the lower limit. This means, of course, selling the foreign exchange or gold reserves they are holding. This applies whether sterling is being offered for sale by British importers who have imported more than our exporters have sold abroad, or whether sterling is being offered by those who have lost confidence and want to switch their resources to some other currency.)

There would, under such a system, be need to alter some of the parities from time to time. This, however, could usually be done before a currency reached its minimum permitted value and without a crisis. This would be necessary if, for example, one country incurred a steadily faster rate of inflation than others. Inflation may be an evil, but if it is impossible to maintain full employment without inflation the latter should be accepted as the lesser evil. And if necessary there should, in the long run, be a change in the parity of a country's currency vis a vis others.

We should get away from the stupidity and callousness of

international bankers who think every balance of payments problem can be solved by deflation and unemployment, and who throw up their hands in indignation at the thought that a country might restrict its imports by tariffs or quota restrictions. The expansion of international trade is desirable, up to a point, but it becomes crazy when rules are rigidly adhered to, even when unemployment is the result. It is quite ridiculous that countries are prepared to see their trade with one particular country cut drastically by deflation and unemployment in that country but get hysterical when the same thing happens through import restrictions, particularly tariffs.

The British Economy

This is not to say that Britain's troubles are all of external origin. There is certainly reason for believing that the present government has never commanded confidence abroad, and perhaps never widely at home. There were recurrent crisis under the Conservatives from 1951 to 1964, but they always came to an end. Since the Labour Government returned to power in 1964 we have been living in a continuous economic crisis. There was an import surcharge imposed shortly after the government came to power in 1964, a measure that was clearly a deliberate controvention of all our treaty obligations. But at that time, the government failed to take the necessary deflationary measures that should have accompanied the import restrictions. Although deflation is not an ideal way out of balance of payments difficulties *in itself*, it is a necessary measure in order to allow balance of payments equilibrium to be reached. The greater our success in cutting imports or boosting exports, the more necessary it is to curtail purchasing power at home. If we export more of our own goods, or import fewer foreign goods, there are fewer goods on the home market. If we do not curtail the purchasing power available, the tendency will be for the price of these goods to rise, undermining our competitive position abroad and preventing the continued improvement in our balance of payments.

These measures were not taken in 1964, but they became

necessary in 1965. Since then, deflationary budgets have been introduced time and time again.

Rates of indirect taxation have been raised on occasions which are becoming too numerous to count, and as the value of money falls the real burden of direct taxation increases. The point at which a man starts paying income tax at the standard rate is now much lower in real terms than it used to be. A man earning over £958 (married with one child) will now have to pay some tax at the standard rate. Some years ago when £800 would have bought as much as £950 today, such a man would have been nowhere near paying standard rate. A married man with one child earning £1,125 a year (about the average today for a manual worker in industry) will now pay £134 income tax or 12 per cent of his income. When £990 represented the same purchasing power (perhaps four or five years ago), he would have paid only £92 in tax or just under 10 per cent of his salary. Thus for a typical manual worker the burden of income tax has been increased by 20 per cent merely as the result of inflation.

Tax increases may be acceptable when imposed to meet a passing crisis, or to meet public expenditure that people recognise to be necessary and which they really want. Continuous increases in both indirect taxation and in direct taxation when properly measured is another matter. Over four years of Labour rule leaves people still wondering what new burdens will be imposed in the next budget.

There is a great deal that needs to be done at home. There are plenty of instances of low productivity, both as a result of inefficient management and restrictive practices by unions. We need an incomes policy to ensure that wages and other incomes do not rise faster than productivity. We need to boost productivity, but not by bribes to those operating restrictive practices and more limited pay increases to those fully pulling their weight. New ideas are needed, but perhaps above all new leadership.

There are many obstacles to successful private investment and the political instability of some developing countries is one of the worst. A solution here is essential, but it will not come easily. It cannot be found at once. Meanwhile investment can still be eased in any of several ways which Father Maxwell takes note of in this concluding article.

Private Investment and Overseas Development

5: Obstacles to Private Investment

J. F. MAXWELL

IN some developing countries there is a political climate which is definitely hostile to direct private foreign investment, and government regulations discriminate unfairly against foreign-owned or foreign-controlled assets. Here is a quotation from Sir Duncan Oppenheim, Chairman of British-American Tobacco Co., writing in January, 1965 :

" We have to understand that most countries are bound to be sensitive, and it is by no means unreasonable for them to insist upon certain conditions, such as partnership with local capital so far as it may exist, employment and training of local technicians and managers, and so on. Regulations of this sort, if reasonably and realistically applied, ought not normally to be regarded as obstacles.

I will now attempt to compile a list of obstacles, but this list is by no means complete, bearing in mind that any tendency to discriminate against foreign investment is a discouragement.

1. Depreciating exchange rates [resulting from] internal inflation.

2. Unstable government, or the risk of an extremist government coming to power, or a government inclined towards nationalisation.
3. Unfair or discriminatory treatment of existing private investment, including a record of expropriation of, perhaps, other sectors of industry.
4. Excessive company taxation.
5. Inadequate legal system, or inefficient or unreliable political or administrative system; also price control, protectionism affecting the necessary imports of raw materials or spare parts.
6. Unrealistic restrictions on the employment of essential foreign staff.
7. [Unrealistic] regulations providing a fixed percentage for local participation.”(1)

There was a time for some industrialized countries when lack of risk capital was an obstacle to direct private investment in developing countries. Since the second world war, in the very different conditions after the end of the colonial era, this is no longer the case. A multitude of financial intermediaries and development-banks exist which can assist with such private investment. An example is the International Finance Corporation which can supply funds to assist smaller investors in developing countries.

Politics and Private Investment

Nowadays it can be the political factors, the “investment climate” in the developing countries, which can provide very serious obstacles. Here are the comments of Mr. Hellmuth Führer:

“On the political side, the most obvious obstacle to private foreign investment is the risk of partial or total expropriation — either directly or through ‘creeping expropriation’ by which the investor is gradually forced to liquidate because of punitive controls or regulatory actions by the host government. . . .

(1) Sir Duncan Oppenheim, Chairman, British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd., “Obstacles to Overseas Investment”, article in *British Industry*; published by the F.B.I., Jan. 8, 1965, pp. 30-31.

One of the most important prerequisites for an expanded flow of private capital is the existence of reasonably stable political and economic conditions. . . . Each country must be free to determine its own political and economic structure in light of its own historical development and its needs for the future. . . . However . . . each country should decide on a clear and unambiguous attitude toward foreign private capital. . . . The laws and regulations relating to taxation, the allocation of Foreign exchange for imports, and any measures affecting company management should give the same treatment to foreign capital as to local capital. . . .

Potential investors in capital exporting countries have often expressed their desire to be covered against risks of a non-commercial nature. Since risk considerations play a large part in investment decisions, insurance or guarantees may help to stimulate private foreign investment in less-developed areas. Three countries — the U.S., Japan and Germany — have established investment insurance programmes covering private capital exports against political risks, and several other countries contemplate doing so. The IBRD has prepared a report which examines the problems and possibilities of setting up a multilateral investment insurance scheme. . . . National experience in these fields are quite recent, and there is no readily available answer to the basic question as to whether the coverage of non-commercial risks would substantially increase private foreign investment, and, in particular, whether a multilateral programme is likely to be more effective in this respect than national programmes. . . .

A related contribution to the establishment of a better general atmosphere as a means of promoting the flow of private capital might be made in the form of a clear statement of general legal principles relating to the protection of foreign property, combined with rules designed to render the application of these principles more effective. These principles have been embodied in a *Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property*

which has been prepared by OECD." (2)

Insurance and Private Investment

The United States bilateral insurance scheme to cover U.S. private investors has operated since 1948 and, to June 30th, 1965, the cumulative total amount of investment guarantees amounted to \$2,260 million. Various multilateral insurance schemes have recently been considered by the World Bank and OECD. Here is a quotation from the World Bank's Staff Report on this subject, dated March, 1962:

"While the principal proposals for multilateral investment insurance differ from one another in detail, essentially they would all call for an international organization with membership drawn from both capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, which would insure private foreign investments in the less developed countries against certain risks. As a minimum, protection would be available against loss resulting from expropriation or nationalization without adequate compensation; inability to transfer profits or to repatriate capital; and international war. Some proposals would extend to loss resulting from government action, short of outright seizure, which substantially deprives an investor of the control or the benefit of his investment (sometimes described as 'creeping expropriation'), and some would protect against loss from revolution or insurrection. Protection would not be available against normal business risks or any risk for which insurance coverage could be purchased from private sources.

Under most proposals only a percentage of loss would be insured, with the investor a self-insurer for the balance. Only new investments would be insured, for a term of years and upon payment of an annual premium. As already noted, it is a feature of most proposals that administration be entrusted to the Bank.

It would be a condition of participation under some but not all proposals that countries accept certain

(2) Hellmuth Führer; *loc. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

minimum rules of good conduct vis-à-vis foreign investments made in their territories (e.g. non-discriminatory treatment, no expropriation except for a public purpose and against full compensation promptly paid and freely transferable, etc.)" (3)

And Sir Duncan Oppenheim concludes :

"If a scheme should come into force under which the non-commercial risks inherent in foreign investment could be covered (particularly if coupled with a code of conduct), many of the obstacles which at present exist would be alleviated. It is to be hoped that H.M.G. will give their support to this idea, but the signs so far are not very hopeful. Owing to the present state of the balance of payments, H.M.G. are not very favourably inclined to anything which encourages more foreign investment, especially outside the Sterling Area, and have reservations to the scheme [of insurance guarantees for overseas investment, arranged multilaterally] in principle." (4)

Centre for Arbitration and Disputes

Another means of overcoming the difficulties which can arise as a result of the conflict of interests of the developing country and of the foreign investor, is the already established multilateral centre for the hearing and arbitration of disputes which can arise over such direct private investments in developing countries. Here is a quotation from *Problèmes Africaines* dated November 17th, 1966:

"The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes came into force on October 14, 1966. It establishes an international centre for settlement by conciliation and arbitration proceedings and the recognition of arbitral awards.

This Convention has been established under the aegis of the International Bank for Reconstruction and

(3) Staff Report, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: *Multilateral Investment Insurance*, March 1962, p. 2.
(4) Sir Duncan Oppenheim; *loc cit.*, p. 31.

Development, and was submitted on March 18th, 1965, to the governments of member-countries of the Bank for their signature and ratification.

By November 17th, 1966, twenty States had signed and ratified the convention:

Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast, Dahomey, United States, Gabon, Ghana, Upper Volta, Iceland, Jamaica, Malwai, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Uganda, Holland, Central African Republic, Republic of Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Chad, Tunisia.

The Other States which have signed but not yet ratified the Convention are:

Afghanistan, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cameroons, China, Cyprus, Korea, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Luxemburg, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, United Kingdom, Senegal, Somalia, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago." (5)

The Administrative Council of this new International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes had its inaugural meeting on February 2nd, 1967.

Transfer of Ownership and Control

Yet another means of overcoming the difficulties which can arise as the result of a conflict of interest between a developing country and the foreign investor would be an agreement concerning the ultimate transfer of the ownership and control of the foreign branch or subsidiary after a period of time of profitable investment, with full guarantee for the rights and interests of the parent company. Here are the words of Mr. W. M. Clarke:

"The French economist, Jeanneney, speaking in a private capacity to a study group of the *Conseil National du Patronat Français* in June 1964, made the basic assumption that in fifty years public opinion within the developing countries would have forced the

(5) *Problemes Afracaines*; no. 364, Thur. Nov. 17th, 1966, p. 1

take-over of foreign investments. His firm conclusion was that Western Countries must plan a means of co-operation with local enterprise with this development (virtually the 1789 of the poorer nations) in mind." (6)

And here are the suggestions of Mr. Arthur Gaitskell:

"If it really is their economic development which is the objective, the question arises as to how long foreign capital and management are necessary. This may seem a revolutionary suggestion to those who invested in some mine or plantation and imagine it would be for ever. Nevertheless, it is a question which ought to be faced. Without any doubt, association with foreign capital and management would seem far more tolerable, if not positively welcomed, if some kind of time limit could be envisaged when the undertaking would be in local hands. This is particularly true of major assets which dominate a country's revenue. The alternative has so often ended in nationalisation without compensation. If the Western World is going to fit in with developing countries' aims, it is essential to ask ourselves whether there is any need for permanency. There must be instances on innumerable occasions in our business life when an enterprise has been transferred from one collection of shareholders to another. It is usually a matter of trying to arrange fair terms, and after the deal the departing capital is employed in other directions. It is not impossible for such terms to be thought out in advance. Nor is the risk of being wrong in such forecasts so obviously greater than the risk of nationalisation and the risk of insecurity of government in countries where issues like this are left uncertain.

Apart from major undertakings which may merit such an arrangement with the local government, an alternative method, in any case, is a regular plan to convert the initial foreign capital to local capital by selling shares to the local public, to establish local control over a

(6) W. M. Clarke; *op. cit.*, p. 48.

period, and to reinvest the moneys paid in other enterprises in the same country, rather on the analogy of the objectives of the Commonwealth development Corporation. One might well wonder if the history of Cuba might not have been different if such attitudes had been taken by expatriate capital, although, of course, there were other elements in the Cuban situation.” (7)

Balance of Payments

Another obvious difficulty on the side of the industrialised countries is the question of balance of payments. The United States and Britain and other capital exporting countries cannot ignore the implications for their own balance of payments of considerable outflows of private capital.

Sir Duncan Oppenheim points out that existing foreign exchange controls may reduce enormously the benefits which British direct private investment could bring to the countries, say, of Latin America, which are outside the Sterling Area, and he suggests that relaxation of these controls should be an objective of British Government policy:

“At present all purchases of foreign exchange for investment in non-Sterling Areas are subject to control. This means that official exchange for any investment (in excess of a small limit) will not be granted unless clear and commensurate benefit to the U.K. balance of payments can be shown in the short term, normally regarded as two years. Direct investment projects which do not satisfy this test may be financed provided approval is obtained either by borrowing abroad or by using the non-sterling currency proceeds of the sale of foreign securities (whether portfolio investments or not); i.e. so-called ‘switch-dollars’ which stand at a premium. Moreover, companies need permission before their overseas subsidiaries in the non-Sterling Areas can finance major expansion projects or use the resources available to them for investment in other business ventures.

(7) *Op. cit.* pp. 54-55. Compare the suggestion of Mr. George Goyder, *The Responsible Company*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, pp. 105-106.

Obviously, British investment outside the Sterling area in, say, the developing countries of Latin America, is severely restricted by the current regulations.

... If our foreign exchange position permitted return to the pre-July 1961 position of relative freedom, capital would flow where it would earn the greatest return and thus supply the needs of a greater number of non-Sterling developing countries. Foreign private investment in a non-Sterling Area does tend to be treated as a residual requirement after all other claims on our foreign resources have been met." (8)

Double Taxation

Another obvious difficulty which can only be overcome by constructive action by the Governments concerned, is the question of double taxation — in the developing country and on profits repatriated to the parent company — and also the lack of tax benefits and incentives to companies which invest in developing countries. Some industrialised countries are negotiating a network of bilateral double taxation agreements, and the OECD has made some suggestions in its Report entitled *Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in Developing Countries* published in 1965.

Here are the views of Sir Sydney Caine, Director of the London School of Economics, on the existing corporation tax in Britain:

"As a deliberate act of policy Mr. Callaghan's [the Chancellor of the Exchequer] corporation tax scheme in 1964 effectively discontinued this system of setting off overseas taxes. He made it clear in his budget that he had in mind the lower net return to the country as a whole of overseas investment under the old arrangements [of double taxation agreements], and that he expected the balance of payments to benefit by a diminution of the flow of investment overseas resulting from the reduction of the net return to the home investor. The effect of the new system under which the shareholder

(8) Sir Duncan Oppenheim, "What Britain Does," *Times Review of Industry and Technology*, Sept. 1964, p. 17.

bears corporation tax on top of overseas income tax is a simple matter of calculation . . . In considering how to remove the tax disincentive one must recognise the 'prima facie' strength of Mr. Caliaghan's argument, granted always that the criterion to be applied is that of national . . . [i.e. United Kingdom] advantage. A given gross return on an investment was, under the old tax adjustment system, only about half as valuable to the country as a whole when the investment was external as when it was internal, simply because the overseas government got the taxman's share instead of our government getting it." (9)

(9) Sir Sydney Caine: "*Beyond the Arithmetic*". Address dated March 16th, 1967, published in *Overseas Investment or Economic Nationalism*; Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967, pp. 14-15.

Book Reviews

WAR WITHOUT END

The Assault on the West by Ian Greig; Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd., 35s.; pp. 357.

Mr. Ian Greig follows the line of many responsible authors, who understand the meaning of International Communism and its continued attack on the free world. Thanks, however, to the deceitful skill of communist propaganda along with what Mr. Greig calls "a natural Western eagerness to ease tensions with the Soviet Bloc", little notice is taken of the constant threat offered by Communists, except when it shows its claws, as when Red China overran Tibet or the Soviet Union occupied Czechoslovakia. Very few realise that total war is being waged by International Communism against the West; still less do they understand the nature of the weapons used. This only makes Mr. Greig's contribution all the more valuable. He places before the reader the facts as well as the strategy of communist subversion in the free world.

Most potent perhaps of all the weapons used by International Communism is the propaganda barrage whose aim is "to propagate the gospel of Communism . . . by the dissemination of printed material on an unsurpassed scale, an ever-increasing use of radio broadcasting, and an energetic cultural offensive involving the adroit use of films, cultural missions and exchanges and exhibitions". The importance which the Communist Bloc attaches to this form of warfare may be estimated by the sums of money spent each year on it. In 1960, the total was £170m. Over the air, in 1965, the Soviet Union and Communist China were broadcasting from eighty stations for listeners outside their own borders, as against nine stations used by the BBC and 17 by the Voice of America. The content of these communist broadcasts follows the usual pattern. Every international event is presented in a manner designed to give maximum possible backing to communist foreign policy and the communist way of life.

It is common knowledge that Communist Parties throughout the free world have provided International Communism with suitable bases for its activities. Out of this has come the International Communist Front, which was described, in 1926, by a member of the Comintern as existing "to create a whole solar system of organisations and smaller committees round the Communist Party, small organisations working actually under the influence of the Party, although not under its mechanical leadership". These attract their members from outside the Party and often include distinguished people of liberal outlook in various walks of life. In a good many countries of the free world, unsuspecting people of vaguely good intention have found themselves walking into the kind of trap set by these smaller organisations round the local Communist Party. At a later stage — and often without knowing it — they will find themselves partners to a communist policy, planned and set by the few communist members of the organisation in question. Organisations of this sort are of several kinds. There are, for example, those which are international in their membership, like the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Then, there are the various Friendship Societies, formed by Communists and their sympathisers in countries of the free world and having for their ultimate aim a close, working liaison with the local Communist Embassy, and so on. It is to contacts discovered through this sort of interchange that Communist Intelligence looks, no doubt, for many of its local agents. There can be no doubt whatsoever with regard to its power or the all-pervasive nature of its activities. Only occasionally are these revealed to their full extent, as when, for example, the discovery of Canadian and Australian communist spy rings made headlines in the world's Press. In the Soviet Union and China, foreign students, especially from developing countries, are trained in methods of espionage and subversion against the day of their return home as dedicated Communists. This practice began actively in 1956 and has since continued to grow. To their very great credit, a sizeable minority of these students have refused, on their return, to play the communist game. It is not merely interesting, but

horrifying to learn that the Communist Chinese have introduced drugs as a weapon of subversion and for breaking morale in the free world. Today, the production of drugs in China and their smuggling into the free world is under the official and direct control of the Chinese Communist Government. Albania is the European centre of distribution for a section of this foul trade promoted by Communist China.

The words "guerilla" and "Communist" are now almost synonymous. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of Mr. Greig's valuable book is that in which he describes the operation of communist guerilla bands in Greece, South-East Asia, Africa, Cuba and Latin America. Communist China now is not merely sending arms to guerillas in the trouble-spots of the world, but designing and producing arms specially suited to their needs.

Mr. Greig's book makes most uncomfortable reading. From it we learn of a ceaseless threat against everything of value for which the West stands. The increasing permissiveness of Western Society serves only to increase its impact.

Cyril Clump, S.J.

CONVERSION

Act of Love by Rosemary Haughton; Geoffrey Chapman, 25s.; pp. 191.

This is a book about faith in the sense of conversion; its title is thus explained by the author: "The act of faith is not enough; if it does not work itself out in some way which can be called loving it is faith stillborn". But also the act of love in the sexual sense is "symbolic and typical. Each repeated act of love is a renewal of the original commitment, a carrying of it into the present, and an opening of it to the future. Yet it is also *part* of the whole routine of living and helps to transform that. It is not a beautiful memorial or repetition, or a continuation, but a making of the present in virtue of the past, and extended towards the future". Here the Eucharist is suggested. But "faith is a universally experienced event . . . without it there is no real human life at all." A number of examples of "secular" conversion is analysed, and it is in these analyses (and also in those from

the Gospels) that the author is at her best. Christian faith, she says, is indeed "different": in Christ man is in a position to enter more completely into the new life though few may actually do so." Clearly, this "new life" is something transcendent, different in kind from which "secular" conversion leads to; but if few actually enter into it it is a pity she does not suggest ways in which they can: a working out, at different levels, of the death and rising of Christ (the centre of the Christian mystery) can make for Christians, and ordinary ones at that. True, she speaks at the end of her book of "the act of love that is faith in Christ . . . sanctifying (the Church's) inadequate members"; but this might have been amplified. We seem to be moving most of the time in a somewhat rarified atmosphere.

The "philosophical" part of chapter three might well, I think, have been omitted, and the last chapter is the weakest (rather like the post-mortem in a badly constructed detective story). Chapters five and six show convincingly how love can be diverted into enthusiasm on the one hand, or institutionalism on the other. This is a book worth the effort of reading, but if you don't want to get bogged down you can, as I have suggested, give the third chapter the go-by.

Francis Fenn, S.J.

READERS WRITE IN

(The Latest Batch)

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